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PROSECUTION LACHES:  HOW SHOULD THIS DEPTH CHARGE TO 
SUBMARINE PATENTS BE APPLIED? 
 
Karl Ondersma 
 
More than 30 years ago, the Uniform Code Council was formed by members of 
the food industry to develop standardized bar codes.1  The UCC eventually grew to 
include over 250,000 members from the food, retail, and manufacturing industries that 
developed and implemented bar code systems for such purposes as inventory control and 
expedited customer service.2  In the 1990s, years after the use of bar codes became 
prevalent in these industries, a patentee named Jerome Lemelson began bringing patent 
infringement suits against the users of this technology.3  Many of those charged with 
infringement took licenses rather than face costly lawsuits.  Those who contested 
Lemelson’s patents, however, argued that he had obtained them by abusing the patent 
process through designed delay meant to entrap those who became reliant on bar code 
technology.  Eventually this argument defeated Lemelson, but not before he had obtained 
approximately 900 licensees and earned nearly $1.5 billion in royalties.4 
 In Symbol Technologies v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, 
LP, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held “the equitable doctrine of laches 
may be applied to bar enforcement of a patent that issued after unreasonable and 
unexplained delay in prosecution, even though the patent applicant complied with 
pertinent statutes and rules.”5  Judge Newman, in a vigorous dissent, commented that the 
recognition of prosecution laches as a defense to a patent infringement suit “will open 
legally granted patents to a new source of satellite litigation of unforeseen scope.”6  
While it is unclear how frequently prosecution laches will be argued by alleged patent 
                                                 
1 Brief of Amici Curiae Uniform Code Council et al. at vi, Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson 
Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
2 Id. 
3 Susan Hansen, Breaking the Bar Code, 3/2004 AM. LAW. 86 (2004) (sending cease and desist letters in 
1989, settling with Japanese auto manufacturers for $100 million in 1992, settling with Ford, GM, and 
Chrysler in 1998, bringing suit against more than 400 additional companies between 1998 and 1999). 
4 Id.; Nicholas Varchaver, The Patent King, FORTUNE, May 3, 2001, at 202 (licensing companies such as 
Alcoa, Boeing, Dow Chemical, Eli Lilly, GE, Ford, GM, Chrysler, IBM, Hewlett-Packard, and Cisco). 
5 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 1361, 
1368 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002). 
6 Id. at 1369; See also ROBERT L. HARMON , PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT §12.3, at 634 (6th Edition 
2003) (“This decision is sure to stir much additional litigation.”). 
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infringers, it is evident that the Federal Circuit has provided limited direction regarding 
the defense to the lower courts that will be hearing those arguments.7    
Since the Federal Circuit decided Symbol Technologies in January 2002, 
numerous district courts have been presented with the equitable defense of prosecution 
laches in patent infringement suits.8  Many of these courts have noted that, thus far, they 
have not been provided any guidance on the scope of this defense to so called submarine 
patents.9  Therefore, the district courts are charting their own courses as to the elements 
of the defense, the burden of proof, and what factors to consider.  Until the Federal 
Circuit speaks further on this equitable defense, the district courts will continue to 
navigate without a compass.   
 This paper presents arguments regarding several issues that the district courts 
have been grappling with due to the limited guidance from the Federal Circuit.  
Specifically, this paper argues: (1) The only element to the defense is that an alleged-
infringer must show an “unreasonable and unexplained delay” by the patentee in 
prosecuting a patent; (2) the alleged-infringer must prove this element by a 
                                                 
7 Jennifer C. Kuhn, Symbol Technologies: The (Re)Birth of Prosecution Laches, 12 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 611, 
612 (2003) (“The exact metes and bounds of the defense are unclear because of the narrow scope of the 
issue presented in the appeal.”); Douglas R. Nemec, Current Trends in Equitable Defenses to Patent 
Infringement:  Prosecution Laches and Inequitable Conduct, 766 PLI/PAT 1035, 1069 (2003) (“[T]he 
various district courts have taken disparate, if not inconsistent approaches to applying prosecution 
laches…”); Christine C. Vito & Thomas A. Turano, New Infringement Defense of Prosecution Laches, 2 
No. 10 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 1 (2002) (“Until a court articulates the elements of this defense, patentees 
likely will be subject to the wild imagination of defendants facing infringement allegations.”). 
8 A&E Products Group, L.P., v. Mainetti USA Inc., No. 01 Civ. 10820, 2004 WL 345841 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
24, 2004); Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, --
F.Supp.2d--, No. CV-S-01-703-PMP, 2004 WL 161331 (D.Nev. Jan.23, 2004); Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 
281 F.Supp.2d 1149 (N.D. Ca. 2003); Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, No. 01-
CV-09871, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23553 (C.D. Ca. Dec. 2, 2003); Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz 
Technology Licensing, No. 01-CV-09871, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23553 (C.D. Ca. Dec. 2, 2003); 
Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 02-C-7008, 2003 WL 22125212 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 5, 
2003); Stambler v. RSA Security, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 74 (D. Del. 2003); Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. 
Computer Motion, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-203-SLR, 2002 WL 31833867 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2002); Digital 
Control Inc. v. McLaughlin Manufacturing Co., Inc. 248 F.Supp.2d 1015 (W.D. Wa. 2003); Digital Control 
Inc., v. McLaughlin Manufacturing Co., Inc., 225 F.Supp.2d 1224 (W.D. Wa. 2002); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. 
Vysis, Inc., No. 99-CV-2688 H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25020 (S.D. Ca. Aug. 2, 2002); Chiron Corp. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 268 F.Supp.2d 1139 (E.D. Ca. 2002). 
9 See, e.g., Chiron Corp., 268 F.Supp.2d at 1141 (“Symbol Technologies affirmed the validity of the 
defense, but did not articulate a test for when the defense is established.”); Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 2002 
WL 31833867 at *3 (“Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the Federal Circuit has provided any further 
guidance on the legal standards applicable to the prosecution laches defense.”); Reiffin, 281 F.Supp.2d at 
1151 (“Although the Federal Circuit…held that the doctrine of prosecution laches may be invoked to bar an 
infringement prosecution, the Federal Circuit has, as yet, provided no guidance concerning the elements of 
the defense (or counter-claim) or the burden of proof a defendant must meet to prove prosecution laches.”). 
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preponderance of the evidence; (3) no presumption of prosecution laches based on any 
determinate time of patent prosecution should apply; and (4) the defense should apply to 
post-GATT patents and patents containing terminal disclaimers.  Finally, this paper 
proffers several factual considerations that should be weighed in assessing the 
reasonableness and explanation of any delays in patent prosecution.  In reaching these 
conclusions regarding prosecution laches, this paper examines both the historical and the 
Federal Circuit’s recent treatment of the defense, compares the defense to other equitable 
patent infringement defenses, analyzes the district court cases dealing with prosecution 
laches post Symbol Technologies, and reviews several common patent prosecution 
practices. 
 Part I of this paper presents the problem addressed by the equitable doctrine of 
prosecution laches relative to the patent laws and the marketplace.  Part II presents the 
historical roots of the prosecution laches defense and details the Federal Circuit’s limited 
treatment of the doctrine.  Part III presents the arguments for the above noted element, 
burden of proof, and application of the defense.  Part IV discusses factors that should be 
considered in assessing the reasonableness and explanation for any delay in patent 
prosecution.  Part V concludes that district courts will continue to be presented with the 
defense and the Federal Circuit must further expound on the doctrine lest widely varying 
results in patent infringement suits occur. 
 
I. Problem Addressed by Prosecution Laches 
 
The Supreme Court has often stated, “[t]he patent laws ‘promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts’ by rewarding innovation with a temporary monopoly.”10  The 
patent laws indicate, according to the Court, a congressional determination that the Patent 
Clause of the Constitution is “best served by free competition and exploitation of either 
that which is already available to the public or that which may be readily discerned from 
publicly available material.”11  Therefore, the patent laws strike a “careful balance 
                                                 
10 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730 (2002) (citing U.S. CONST. 
art. I, §8, cl.8.). 
11 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989). 
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between public right and private monopoly to promote certain creative activity.”12  In 
establishing this balance, the Court has noted that “[t]he monopoly is a property right; 
and like any property right, its boundaries should be clear.  This clarity is essential to 
promote progress, because it enables efficient investment in innovation.  A patent holder 
should know what he owns, and the public should know what he does not.”13   
 A patent gives its owner the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, 
or offering to sell the patented invention.14  The Supreme Court has noted that the quid 
pro quo granted to an inventor in exchange for this right to exclude is the disclosure 
required by the patent laws.15  Specifically, an inventor’s patent must  
 
describe their work in ‘full, clear, concise, and exact terms,’ as part of the 
delicate balance the law attempts to maintain between inventors, who rely 
on the promise of the law to bring the invention forth, and the public, 
which should be encouraged to pursue innovations, creations, and new 
ideas . . . .16 
 
The written specification, claims, and prosecution history of an issued patent serve a 
“public notice function,” in that they stake the boundaries of the inventor’s claimed 
property right. 17  Unfortunately, if the issuance of a patent is unreasonably delayed, the 
public is never provided any notice. 
 Patents are obtained through a process commonly referred to as “patent 
prosecution.”  Patent prosecution begins with an inventor, or “patentee,” filing an 
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  Frequently, 
patent applications are filed by a patent attorney or patent agent on behalf of an inventor.  
A patent examiner at the PTO will then substantively review the application to determine 
whether the disclosed invention satisfies the patent laws and is thus patentable.  During 
                                                 
12 Id. at 167. 
13 Festo, 535 U.S. at 730-31 (the Supreme Court went on to hold that some indeterminacy was allowable 
relative to the equitable doctrine of equivalence, however, this dealt with subtle interpretations as to the 
scope of equivalents relative to the disclosure as compared to the complete lack of disclosure of a 
submarine patent). 
14 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2004). 
15 See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (“The 
disclosure required by the Patent Act is ‘the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.’” (quoting Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974))). 
16 Festo, 535 U.S. at 731 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112). 
17 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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this substantive review, the patentee is given a limited number of opportunities to present 
arguments to any objections raised by the examiner in regard to patentability.  A patent 
will be issued if the patentee is successful in overcoming any objections that may arise.  
However, if the patentee is not able to overcome the examiner’s objections, the 
application is rejected and a patent is not issued. 
 Those who advocated that the Federal Circuit recognize the doctrine of 
prosecution laches did so to combat what are commonly termed “submarine” patents.18  
A submarine patent derives its name from the scenario in which an industry develops and 
matures around a specific invention or technology and, once the industry is economically 
viable, a previously unknown pending patent will “surface” on the date it is granted by 
the PTO.  The result is that the continued practice of the invention or technology 
constitutes infringement of the patent.19  Those in the industry that are placed in this 
awkward position are then subject to royalty demands from the patent owner or face a 
potential costly patent infringement suit.  
 A submarine patent is derived through divisional, continuation, and continuation-
in-part applications.  These types of applications allow the patentee, prior to the issuance, 
final rejection, or abandonment of a patent application, to file one or more additional 
applications that claim the benefit of the earlier filed application.20  As there is no limit to 
the number of continuation applications that may be filed and depend from a single 
original application,21 a series or chain of patents may eventually emanate from one 
application.  The act of claiming priority in the new application to the prior application 
enables the new application to be considered as having been filed with the PTO on the 
date of the original, first filed application.  This priority date is important as it is, 
generally speaking, used to determine what does and does not infringe any subsequently 
issued patent.  Significantly, in some cases, if the patentee chooses to continually 
                                                 
18 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 1361, 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
19 Steve Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend Around a Patent 
that a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 11, 13 (1999). 
20 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1999) (describing conditions under which a continuation application may have benefit 
of an earlier filing date); 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1975) (describing conditions under which a divisional 
application is allowed after a restriction requirement is issued by the PTO). 
21 In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253, 254 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (“[T]here is no statutory basis for fixing an arbitrary 
limit to the number of prior applications through which a chain of copendency may be traced to obtain the 
benefit of the filing date of the earliest of a chain of copending applications.”) 
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abandon the prior application from which the new patent depends, this chain can continue 
without any public knowledge of the claimed invention. 
 
II. Historical and Federal Circuit Treatment of Prosecution Laches 
 
 A review of the historical development of the equitable doctrine of prosecution 
laches is important for an appreciation of what the courts have viewed as the basis for the 
defense and an understanding of situations in which the doctrine has been applied.  
Additionally, the Federal Circuit’s recognition of the defense in Symbol Technologies 
relied heavily on four early Supreme Court cases that discussed the doctrine. 
  
A. Historical Development of Prosecution Laches 
 
 The proposition that an individual’s dilatory conduct can cause injury to the 
public and should therefore prohibit the individual from being rewarded with a patent is 
well known in patent law.  In the 1829 case of Pennock v. Dialogue, a patentee brought 
an infringement suit against a defendant on a patent covering high-pressure hose. 22  The 
defendant responded by challenging the patent grant, arguing that the span of seven years 
from invention to obtainment of the patent, and the wide spread public use of the 
invention during that time, rendered the patent unenforceable.23  While the defendant’s 
argument dealt with the inventor’s delay in applying for the patent, as opposed to a delay 
in prosecuting the patent, some of the language used in Pennock poignantly echoes 
modern concerns addressed by the doctrine of prosecution laches. 24 
 In holding that a claim of infringement could be barred when the invention is 
publicly used or sold prior to the filing of an application for patent, Justice Story stated, 
“[n]o public policy is overlooked; and no injury can ordinarily occur to the [] inventor, 
which is not in some sort the result of his own laches or voluntary inaction.”25  The 
defendant argued that such a policy must be enforced for otherwise an inventor would 
                                                 
22 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829) 
23 Id. at 7-9. 
24 A delay in filing an application for patent is now addressed under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (denying patent 
protection if an invention was publicly disclosed more than one year prior to filing the application). 
25 Pennock, 27 U.S. at 23. 
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delay applying for a patent until “[t]he moment that his invention comes into the most 
common or public use . . . .  When the public have fully got possession of it, he seeks to 
withdraw it . . . and appropriate it to himself.  This is directly contrary to the design of the 
law.26  Interestingly, the defendant’s argument in Pennock is similar to the arguments that 
district courts hear today from accused infringers claiming that prosecution laches 
renders the allegedly infringed patent unenforceable.27 
 One commentator notes that perhaps the first reported case addressing prosecution 
laches is Adams v. Jones, an 1859 case from the Circuit Court of the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.28  Adams filed for a patent in 1850 on an improvement in door locks and 
the commissioner of patents initially refused to grant him a patent.  Adams was rendered 
a favorable decision on appeal and finally granted a patent in 1857.  Jones defended the 
charge of infringement by arguing that the patent was void because the invention had 
been publicly used more than two years prior to patenting.29 
 Citing Pennock, the court recognized that patents had been held void when the 
inventor allowed the invention to be used publicly before applying for a patent.  
However, the court distinguished Pennock because Adams had filed his application 
before public use and the delay in the grant of the patent “was not in consequence of any 
laches of” Adams.30  Significantly, the court did note that, “[a] man might justly be 
treated as having abandoned his application if it be not prosecuted with reasonable 
                                                 
26 Id. at 13. 
27 See Digital Control Inc. v. McLaughlin Manufacturing Co., Inc., 225 F.Supp.2d 1244, 1226 (“By 
delaying disclosure and issuance . . . a plaintiff might unfairly attempt to claim an invention once an 
industry is fully developed and commercialized.”). 
28 Joseph Scott Miller, The Historical Roots of Patent Prosecution Laches, OREGON INTEL. PROP. 
NEWSLETTER, Spring 2002, at 8 (2002) (citing Adams v. Jones, 1 F.Cas.126 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1859)), available 
at http://www.lclark.edu/faculty/jsmiller/objects/Laches.pdf.  
29 Adams, at 126-27. 
30 The court noted that  
[t]he testimony shows that the complainant made and sold locks with his improvement, 
more than two years before his patent, but after his original application…By this 
application, Adams fully disclosed to the public his invention, and gave notice of his 
intention to demand a patent.  He ought not to lose his rights because of the want of 
perspicacity of the first commissioner.  The delay in the decision of the appeal was not in 
consequence of any laches of complainants, but of the inability of the aged chief justice 
to attend to the business of his office. 
    Id. 
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diligence.  But involuntary delays, not caused by the laches of the applicant, should not 
work a forfeiture of his rights.”31 
 It appears that the Supreme Court first recognized a form of prosecution laches in 
1879 in Planing-Machine Co. v. Keith.32  In Planing, the patentee applied for a patent in 
1848 on a wood planning machine, but did not receive the patent until 1873.  The 
application was rejected by the Patent Office in 1849 and the Court noted “no serious 
attempt appears to have been made to procure a re-examination, or to renew it, for a 
period of more than twenty years.”33  At the time, a rule existed that deemed applications 
abandoned if they were not prosecuted within two years after being rejected or 
withdrawn.34  However, an 1870 act of Congress reversed this rule and granted inventors 
a six-month grace period after passage of the act within which to renew their 
application.35  The patentee in Planing took advantage of this time window to renew his 
application and was eventually granted the patent at issue. 
 Despite the patentee in Planing having complied with the relevant patent laws, the 
Court held it was 
 
the intention of Congress to require diligence in prosecuting the claims to 
an exclusive right.  An inventor cannot without cause hold his application 
pending during a long period of years, leaving the public uncertain 
whether he intends ever to prosecute it, and keeping the field of his 
invention closed against other inventors.36 
 
Notably, the only “circumstances which will excuse delay in prosecuting an application 
for a patent” that the Court provided were “extreme poverty of the applicant, or 
protracted sickness.”37 
 In 1920 the Supreme Court dealt with a laches argument in regards to an 
interference proceeding in Chapman v. Wintroath.38  The patentees had filed an 
application in 1909 on “an improvement in deep well pumps” that was still pending 
                                                 
31 Id. 
32 Miller, supra note 28 (citing Planing-Machine Co. v. Keith, 101 U.S. 479 (1879)). 
33 Planing-Machine Co. at 482-83. 
34 Id. at 483. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 485. 
37 Id. at 485-86. 
38 Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126 (1920). 
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before the Patent Office in 1915.39  In 1912, during this prolonged period of prosecution, 
the defendant filed an application relating to the same field that resulted in the issuance of 
a patent in 1915.  Twenty months after the patent issued, the patentees filed a divisional 
of their original application in which they copied the claims of the issued patent in order 
to provoke an interference.40  On appeal from the interference proceeding, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the patentees’ divisional application was 
deficient for the delay of twenty months.  The court ruled that the presentation of copied 
claims to the Patent Office to provoke an interference must be done “within one year 
from the date of the patent, and that longer delay in filing constitutes equitable laches, 
which bars the later application.”41 
 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and held that the patentees had two 
years within which to file the divisional application that resulted in the interference.  The 
Court noted it was “not intending to intimate that there may not be abandonment which 
might bar an application within the two-year period allowed for filing”; however, the 
Court pointed out that the lower court decision was not based on “any evidence with 
respect to laches or abandonment,” but rather “rests its judgment…wholly upon the delay 
of the [patentees] in filing their divisional application for more than one year after the 
[defendant’s] patent was issued.”42  In contrast, the Court specifically noted: 
 
There is no suggestion in the record that the original application of the 
[patentees] was not prosecuted strictly as required by the statutes and the 
rules of the Patent Office, and therefore it is settled their rights may not be 
denied or diminished on the ground that such delay may have been 
prejudicial to either public or private interests.43 
  
In 1923 the Supreme Court again was confronted with dilatory conduct by a 
patentee in Woodbridge v. United States.44  Woodbridge had applied for a patent in 1852 
related to the application of a ring to a projectile for use in a rifled cannon.  After the 
patent was granted, but before it issued, Woodbridge availed himself of a Patent Office 
                                                 
39 Id. at 132. 
40 Id.  An interference is a judicial determination of priority of invention between two parties claiming 
ownership of an invention.  See 35 U.S.C. § 135. 
41 Id. at 134. 
42 Id. at 139. 
43 Id. at 136-37. 
44 Woodbridge v. United States 263 U.S. 50, 44 S.Ct. 45 (1923). 
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practice of placing a patent in a “secret archive” for up to one year.  However, it was not 
until after more than nine years that Woodbridge wrote to the patent office requesting that 
the patent be issued “‘it being only lately that any immediate opportunity of rendering it 
pecuniarily available has occurred.’”45 
 The Supreme Court held “that Woodbridge forfeited his right to a patent by his 
delay in taking it from 1852 to 1862,”46 noting the “delay of 9 ½ years in securing a 
patent . . . for the admitted purpose of making the term of the monopoly square with the 
period when the commercial profit from it would be highest.” 47   
 In stating, “[t]his is not a case of abandonment.  It is a case of forfeiting the right 
to a patent by designed delay,” the Court was emphasizing that “[n]o case cited to us 
presents exactly these facts.”48  However, the Court cited Pennock and Planing-Machine, 
amongst other cases, when it noted: 
 
[T]he general principles upon which this court has proceeded in cases of 
abandonment by conduct and its views of the rights of the public, and the 
purpose of the constitutional authority to grant patents and of Congress in 
its legislative execution of that purpose, set forth in those cases, leave no 
doubt of the conclusion we must reach . . . our conclusion rests, not on 
neglect and intention to give up the patent, but on a deliberate and 
unlawful purpose to postpone the term of the patent the inventor always 
intended to secure.49 
  
One year later, in Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electric Co., the Court was 
faced with another laches issue.50  In Webster, the patentee had filed an original 
application in 1910 directed to a support for the mounting of electrical ignition devices.51  
During the prosecution of this application, the patentee filed two divisional applications 
to provoke interferences with several other patents that had issued.52  After a finding 
against the patentee in one of the interferences, the patentee amended the divisional 
                                                 
45 Id. at 52-53. 
46 Id. at 63. 
47 Id. at 56. 
48 Id. at 56-58. 
49 Id. at 59. 
50 Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electric Co., 264 U.S. 463 (1924). 
51 Id. at 464. 
52 Id. 
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application and added at least two broader claims.  This divisional application eventually 
issued in 1918.53 
 The Supreme Court noted that the broader claims at issue in the infringement suit 
were first presented to the Patent Office by amendment to the divisional application eight 
years and four months after the original application was filed.54  During this delay, the 
Court found, the subject matter of the claims was in general use by the public and the 
patentee “simply stood by and awaited developments.”55  The Court held that this was “a 
case of unreasonable delay and neglect on the part of the applicant and his assignee in 
bringing forward claims broader than those originally sought.”56   
 The holding of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the patentee’s 
“laches barred his right to [the broader claims]” 57 was affirmed by the Supreme Court.58 
The Court also established the rule that the two-year time limit within which reissue 
applications could be filed applied to divisional applications “in cases involving laches, 
equitable estoppel or intervening private or public rights,” and that it “can only be 
avoided by proof of special circumstances justifying a longer delay.”59 
 In the 1927 case of Overland Motor Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., the Supreme 
Court notably refused to apply laches to prevent a patentee from asserting his patent 
against the alleged infringer.60  During prosecution of a series of patents, the patentee on 
multiple occasions delayed responding to office actions for more than eleven months at a 
time when the statutory response time limit was one year.61  The Supreme Court refused 
to hold that the lack of an excuse for lapses in time between patent applications and 
responses could be used to dismiss the infringement claim. 62 
 The alleged infringer argued that such conduct by the patentee would enable him 
to withhold the invention from the public, add claims to the application to cover 
independent intervening developments of others, and delay the time when the invention 
                                                 
53 Id. at 464-65. 
54 Id. at 465. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 465-66. 
57 Webster Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electric Co., 283 Fed. 83, 94 (7th Cir. 1922). 
58 Webster Electric, 264 U.S. at 471. 
59 Id. 
60 Overland Motor Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 274 U.S. 417 (1927). 
61 Id. at 419. 
62 Id. at 422. 
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became dedicated to the public.63  The Court stated, “[t]he answer to this argument is that 
the matter is entirely within the control of Congress,” and went on to note, “[w]e do not 
know on what principle we could apply the equitable doctrine of abandonment by laches 
in a case where the measure of reasonable promptness is fixed by statute, and no other 
ground appears by reason of which laches could be imputed to the applicant.”64 
 In 1937 the Supreme Court, in Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Ferdinand 
Gutmann Co., Inc., again took up the issue of laches in the prosecution process.65  The 
patentee in Crown Cork filed a divisional application just over two years from the 
issuance of an original patent to invoke an interference.66  The patentee won the 
interference and a patent eventually issued on the divisional patent.67  When the patentee 
asserted this divisional patent against the alleged infringer, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit interpreted Webster as establishing a prima facie two-year time limit for 
the filing of divisional applications, and that an inventor waiting longer than two years 
“must justify his delay by proof of some excuse.”68  As no excuse appeared to the Second 
Circuit, they held the divisional patent “invalid because of laches in filing the application 
on which it was granted.”69 
 On appeal, the Supreme Court corrected the Second Circuit’s belief that Webster 
established a prima facie two-year time limit, stating, “[i]t is clear, that in the absence of 
intervening adverse rights, the decision in Webster . . . does not mean that an excuse must 
be shown for a lapse of more than two years in presenting the divisional application.”70  
Because the question that the Supreme Court was addressing assumed an absence of 
intervening rights, the case was reversed and remanded to the Second Circuit. 
 Similarly, in General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., a case 
decided on the same day as Crown Cork, the Court dealt with an allegation that the filing 
of divisional and continuation applications more then two years subsequent to public use 
                                                 
63 Id. at 423. 
64 Id. at 424. 
65 Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., Inc., 304 U.S. 159 (1938). 
66 Id. at 161. 
67 Id. at 161-62. 
68 Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., Inc., 86 F.2d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1936). 
69 Crown Cork, 304 U.S. at 160.  
70 Id. at 167-68. 
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of the inventions rendered them invalid.71  With respect to two of the four patents in suit, 
the Court noted the lower courts had found there was no public use prior to the filing of 
the divisional applications upon which the patents had issued.72  With respect to the other 
two patents in suit, the Court found that the patentee’s use was the only “public use” and 
that it had not occurred more than two years before the effective filing of the claims.73  
The Court held, therefore, that “[i]n the absence of intervening adverse rights for more 
than two years prior to the continuation applications, they were [filed] in time.”74 
 
B. Federal Circuit’s Treatment of the Defense 
 
The Federal Circuit was created in 1982 and prior to Symbol Technologies had not 
directly recognized the doctrine of prosecution laches.  Furthermore, prior to the Symbol 
Technologies decision the Federal Circuit had given mixed indications regarding the 
applicability of the doctrine.  As such, a review of the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the 
doctrine is also necessary to understand the patent prosecution climate in which 
submarine patents were developed. 
 
 1. Pre-Symbol 
 
 Prior to enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, the continuation and divisional 
application practice was governed by common law.75  One of Lemelson’s arguments at 
the Federal Circuit in Symbol Technologies was that the 1952 Act foreclosed the 
equitable doctrine of prosecution laches.76  Although the Federal Circuit refuted this 
assertion with reference to the legislative history of the Act,77 the viability of the defense 
after 1952 had actually fallen into some question amongst courts.78 
                                                 
71 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 304 U.S. 175, 58 S.Ct. 849 (1938). 
72 Id. at 182-83. 
73 Id. at 183. 
74 Id. 
75 Thomas G. Eshweiler, Ford v. Lemelson and Continuing Application Laches Revisited, 79 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc’y 401, 408-11 (1997). 
76 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 1361, 
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
77 Id. at 1366. 
78 David L. Marcus, Is the Submarine Patent Torpedoed?: Ford Mortor Co. v. Lemelson and the Revival of 
Continuation Application Laches, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 563-64 (1997). 
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 The limited treatment of prosecution laches by the Federal Circuit prior to Symbol 
Technologies also contributed to the questionable viability of the defense.  In the 1986 
case of Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Northern Petrochemcial Co., the Federal 
Circuit noted that the district court had found that the alleged infringer “‘lack[ed] 
evidence of laches or intentional delay under the patent law’” and tacitly recognized the 
defense of prosecution laches when it upheld the district court’s “conclusion that [the 
patentee] had not delayed inequitably and that the prolonged pendency was due to the 
PTO and not to the applicants.”79   
 However, in two later unpublished opinions the Federal Circuit clearly indicated 
that it did not recognize prosecution laches as a viable defense.  In Bott v. Four Star 
Corp., in response to the alleged infringer’s assertion of prosecution laches and citations 
to Webster and Crown Cork, the Federal Circuit opined that it had not been directed to 
any legislative history that the equitable considerations of those cases survived the 1952 
Patent Act.80  Further, the court noted that it was up to Congress to adopt equitable 
safeguards in relation to continuation applications.81  Similarly, in the unpublished 
opinion of Ricoh Company, Ltd. v. Nashua Corp., the Federal Circuit refused to either 
impute a time limit to the seeking of broadened claims or create an intervening rights 
exception to continuation applications.82  The court refused to “judicially adopt equitable 
safeguards, in contravention of established precedent, when Congress itself has declined 
to do so.”83 
 
 2. Symbol 
 
 Any questions that existed regarding the viability of the equitable doctrine of 
laches to the patent prosecution process were answered on January 24, 2002, when the 
Federal Circuit affirmatively answered the sole issue on appeal, holding that “laches may 
be applied to bar enforcement of patent claims that issued after an unreasonable and 
                                                 
79 Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH v. Northern Petrochemical Co., 784 F.2d 351, 356 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
80 Bott v. Four Star Corp., Nos. 88-1117 and 88-1118, 1988 WL 54107 at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 26, 1988). 
81 Id. (citing In re Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253, 262 (C.C.P.A. 1968)). 
82 Ricoh Company Ltd., v. Nashua Corp., No. 97-1344, 1999 WL 88969 at *3 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 1999). 
83 Id. 
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unexplained delay in prosecution even though the applicant complied with pertinent 
statutes and rules.”84   
 The Federal Circuit declared that the defense of prosecution laches originated in 
the two Supreme Court cases of Woodbridge and Webster, and went on to state that the 
defense was later ratified by Crown Cork and General Talking Pictures with respect to 
“new claims issuing from divisional and continuing applications that prejudice 
intervening adverse public rights.”85 With respect to the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Crown Cork, the Federal Circuit stated, “the [C]ourt ratified the existence of the 
prosecution laches defense; it did not apply the defense there in the absence of 
intervening rights.”86  And with respect to General Talking Pictures, the Federal Circuit 
stated, “the Court rejected the defense of prosecution laches because there was no 
evidence of intervening public rights.”87 
 In supporting its position, and refuting that of Lemelson’s, the Federal Circuit 
stated that there was no suggestion in the Supreme Court cases that the doctrine was 
limited to interferences.88  Further, the Federal Circuit declared that the legislative history 
of the 1952 Patent Act suggested that the doctrine of prosecution laches as applied to 
continuation and divisional applications had survived the Act.89  Finally, the Federal 
Circuit declined to be bound by Ricoh and Bott, its two prior non-precedential opinions 
that had previously declined to recognize prosecution laches.90 
  
3. In re Bogese91 
 
 Eight months after the Symbol Technologies decision, the Federal Circuit 
addressed an appeal from a Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (the “Board”) 
decision sustaining an examiner’s position that the patentee had forfeited his right to a 
                                                 
84 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 1361, 
1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
85 Id. at 1364-65. 
86 Id. at 1365. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. at 1365. 
89 Id. at 1366. 
90 Id. at 1366-68. 
91 In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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patent for delay in prosecution.92  In In re Bogese, the Federal Circuit noted that it had 
recently “held that a patent may be rendered unenforceable if it was obtained after an 
unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution.”93  Being unaware of any reason that 
should prohibit the PTO from applying the doctrine of prosecution laches, the court went 
on to state its position that “the PTO’s authority to sanction undue delay is even broader 
than the authority of a district court to hold a patent unenforceable.”94  As an 
administrative agency, however, the court pointed out that the PTO had to first provide 
notice to the patentee of the pending penalty to be imposed prior to declaring a forfeiture 
of the patent application.95 
Bogese, the patentee, filed an original application in 1978 that was later 
abandoned in favor of a continuation application.96  This continuation application reached 
the Federal Circuit two separate times on appeals from adverse Board decisions.97  After 
a per curiam opinion by the Federal Circuit affirming the Board’s second rejection of this 
continuation application, Bogese filed a continuation application without amending the 
claims or offering arguments in favor of patentability and abandoned the previous 
application.98  After a final rejection of this application, Bogese again filed a continuation 
application without amending the claims and abandoned the previous application.99  This 
pattern of filling a continuation application without amending the application or claims 
and abandoning the previous application “exactly or almost exactly six months” after a 
final rejection occurred eleven times over an eight-year period.100 
 In rejecting the last continuation application, the examiner warned Bogese that 
“the next continuation of this series may be rejected by invoking the equitable doctrine of 
laches, absent any substantive amendment to advance prosecution.”101  When Bogese 
filed another file wrapper continuation application, the examiner rejected all pending 
claims, stating: 
                                                 
92 Id. at 1366. 
93 Id. at 1367 (citing Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d. at 1368). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 1368. 
96 Id. at 1363. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 1364. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
 17
 
[A]pplicant has forfeited the right to a patent . . . [by] . . . pursu[ing] a 
deliberate and consistent course of conduct that has resulted in an 
exceptional delay in advancing the prosecution and the issuance of a 
patent . . . Applicant has filed 11 patent applications in which Applicant 
has clearly made no attempt to advance the examination of the claimed 
invention.102 
 
 In affirming this position, the Federal Circuit noted the prolonged duration of 
pendency, Bogese’s practice of abandoning and filing without amendment, and, 
specifically and repeatedly, cited his failure to make a “substantive amendment to 
advance prosecution” when required by the PTO.103  Bogese challenged “the PTO’s 
authority to require applicants to advance prosecution,” but the Federal Circuit stated, 
“[w]e disagree and hold that the PTO has authority to order forfeiture of rights for 
unreasonable delay.”104  
 Two particularly interesting points must be made regarding In re Bogese.  One, 
the Federal Circuit believes that the PTO has broader authority to sanction undue delay 
than does a district court.  Two, the Federal Circuit authorized the PTO “to order 
forfeiture of [patent] rights for unreasonable delay” without regards to whether or not the 
delay is “unexcused,” as must be determined by district courts. 
 The historical and Federal Circuit treatment of prosecution laches indicates that 
the doctrine addresses two issues associated with prolonged patent prosecution; one, the 
improper extension of the term of the monopoly and two, the delay in issuing a patent in 
order to entrap third parties that are practicing the invention.105  Significantly, Symbol 
Technologies has answered the question of the viability of the doctrine of prosecution 
laches, and the Supreme Court’s denial of Lemelson’s petition for certiorari indicates that 
the doctrine is more than just a passing fad.106  The questions now are what constitutes 
                                                 
102 Id. at 1365. 
103 Id. at 1369. 
104 Id. 
105 See Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1142 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (“In addition to 
addressing the concern over patentees extending the terms of their monopolies, the prosecution laches 
defense also responds to concerns that inventors will file narrow claims, await intervening developments, 
and then file broader claims to cover those developments.”). 
106 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 537 U.S. 825 
(2002). 
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“an unreasonable and unexplained delay,” must anything else be shown, what is the 
burden of proof, and what factors might a court look at in analyzing such a defense.  
Indicators of the answers to these questions can be found by looking at district court 
cases hearing prosecution laches arguments, analogizing to established defenses, and 
commenting on actual patent prosecution practices. 
 
III. Arguments As to the Elements, Burden of Proof, and Applicability of the Defense 
 
A. The Only Element is “Unreasonable and Unexplained Delay” 
 
Besides leaving the question open as to what constitutes an “unreasonable and 
unexcused delay,” the Federal Circuit’s decision in Symbol Technologies also did not 
make it clear whether there must additionally be a finding of adverse and intervening 
rights in order to apply prosecution laches.  The sole question on appeal did not 
affirmatively state that there must be such a finding of adverse and intervening rights to 
apply prosecution laches.  However, the Federal Circuit interpreted the decisions of 
Crown Cork and General Talking Pictures as extending prosecution laches to claims 
issuing from continuation and divisional applications, but noted that the doctrine was not 
applied in those two cases because the Court did not find adverse and interfering rights.  
While such a discussion by the Federal Circuit indicates that a finding of adverse and 
intervening rights may be required to establish prosecution laches, it is not without 
question.  Understandably, therefore, district courts dealing with claims of prosecution 
laches have taken conflicting positions with regards to whether or not adverse and 
intervening rights are a necessary element to a finding of prosecution laches. 107 
                                                 
107 See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 281 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1151 (N.D. Ca. 2003) (“There is one element of the 
defense of prosecution laches . . . whether plaintiff unreasonably delayed the prosecution of his patent(s) in 
a manner that cannot be reasonably explained.”); Digital Control Inc. v. McLaughlin Manufacturing Co., 
Inc., 248 F.Supp.2d 1015, 1018 (W.D. Wa. 2003) (“[T]he Court does not consider that an examination of 
intervening adverse rights is a useful concept in prosecution laches when addressing continuation 
applications.”); Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Computer Motion, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-203-SLR, 2002 WL 
31833867, at *3 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2002) (“[T]he court relies on . . . a threshold inquiry . . . as to whether a 
patent was ‘obtained after an unreasonable and unexplained delay in prosecution’ . . . [and] the court must 
consider the fact that prosecution laches is an equitable tool which has been used sparingly in only the most 
egregious of cases.”).  But see Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1141 (E.D. Cal. 2002) 
(applying traditional laches test and therefore requiring a showing of “material prejudice to the alleged 
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 This paper argues that in order to establish prosecution laches as a defense, an 
alleged infringer must show only that the claims in suit issued after an unreasonable and 
unexplained delay in prosecution.  Despite the Federal Circuit’s reference in Symbol 
Technologies to adverse intervening rights and despite the traditional requirement that a 
defendant prove they suffered prejudice in order to invoke laches as a defense, these two 
tenants of patent law are not elements of the Federal Circuit’s revived prosecution laches 
defense.  Rather, the concepts of prejudice and intervening rights are important factors to 
consider when evaluating the reasonableness of a delay. 
 The Federal Circuit stated at least three times in Symbol Technologies and In re 
Bogese that prosecution laches applies to “an unreasonable and unexplained delay in 
prosecution” without any mention that prejudice to the alleged infringer must also be 
shown.108  In defining prosecution laches in this manner, the court was certainly aware of 
its landmark 1992 en banc decision in A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction 
Co. that addressed the laches associated with a delay in bringing a patent infringement 
suit.109  This traditional laches defense addresses the assertion that a patent owner’s delay 
in bringing suit bars pre-filing damages and requires the alleged infringer to show (1) an 
unreasonable and inexcusable delay in bringing suit by the patent owner; and (2) material 
prejudice to the alleged infringer due to the delay.110  The Aukerman court noted that this 
test was based on well-settled law regarding the two prongs of laches:  delay and 
prejudice.111  The notable absence by the Federal Circuit in Symbol Technologies to 
address or even reference prejudice to the alleged infringer as a requirement of 
prosecution laches is evidence that the court does not view it as one of the elements of the 
defense.  The absence of such a discussion is particularly significant as the seminal 
                                                                                                                                                 
infringer attributable to the delay); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., No. 99-CV-2688 H, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25020, at *119 (S.D. Ca. Aug. 2, 2002) (“Prosecution laches thus apply where the patent applicant 
delays deliberately, unreasonably and without excuse the issuance of his patent so as to prejudice the 
intervening rights of another party.”); Verizon Cal. Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, No. 01-
CV-09871, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23553, at *62-63 (C.D. Ca. Dec. 2, 2003) (“[I]t appears that proof of 
‘intervening adverse rights’ is a requisite element of a successful prosecution laches defense.”). 
108 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 
1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002); In re Bogese II, 303 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
109 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
110 Id. at 1028. 
111 Id. at 1026, 1032. 
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Auckerman decision was intended to provide clarity to the application of laches in patent 
infringement suits.112 
 The argument against prejudice to the alleged infringer as an element of the 
prosecution laches defense is bolstered by the recognition of the differences in the 
inequities between prosecution laches and the laches addressed in Aukerman.  The laches 
of Aukerman deals with the delay of the patent owner relative to a specific alleged 
infringer, and more particularly, the delay in bringing suit against that individual.113  Such 
a form of laches, as the Federal Circuit has noted, requires the plaintiff to deal fairly with 
his or her adversary.114  Correspondingly, the remedy to this laches bars only the 
awarding of pre-suit damages.  As such, the patent is not held invalid and the owner may 
still prevent the alleged infringer from violating his or her patent rights, bring suit on 
future infringement by the alleged infringer, or take action against any other alleged 
infringers. 
 In contrast, the delay at issue in prosecution laches is not measured as between the 
patent owner and the alleged infringer, but rather focuses on the delay in the issuing of 
the patent claims that are being asserted.  As this delay is not specific to the alleged 
infringer, a finding that the delay is sufficiently egregious renders the patent 
unenforceable and a patent found unenforceable because of prosecution laches no longer 
grants its owner any rights of exclusion as to any individual.115 
Although not directly stated by the Federal Circuit, prosecution laches must be 
addressing the impact of an unreasonable delay on the public.  As noted, the patent laws 
are intended to promote the progress of science and provide notice to the public of an 
inventor’s claimed property rights.116  Delays in the issuance of the patent claims, 
however, prevent the public from being provided with notice of those claimed rights.117  
While there may not be prejudice to the specific individual against whom an improperly 
acquired patent is being asserted, the public may have suffered an inequity through the 
                                                 
112 ROBERT L. HARMON , PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT §12.3, at 620 (6th Edition 2003). 
113 A.C. Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028. 
114 Id. at 1029 (citing 5 J.N. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §21, at 43 (Equitable Remedies Supp. 1905). 
115 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 
1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
116 See supra notes 10-16. 
117 See supra note 17. 
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patentee’s actions.  Therefore, the effect of the patentee’s unreasonable and unexplained 
delay on the alleged infringer should not be considered an element of the defense. 
Similarly, a determination of adverse intervening rights should also not be 
required to establish the defense of prosecution laches.  The Federal Circuit in Symbol 
Technologies interpreted the Supreme Court holdings in Crown Cork and General 
Talking Pictures as ratifying prosecution laches when adverse intervening rights are 
impaired.  However, the court’s multiple statements that it is an unreasonable and 
unexplained delay that establishes prosecution laches are absent of a requirement that 
adverse intervening rights must also be shown to establish the defense.  Here again, the 
notable absence of such a requirement when plainly considered by the court suggests that 
a showing of adverse intervening rights is not required to prove prosecution laches. 
In re Bogese provides further proof that adverse intervening rights are not an 
element of prosecution laches.  As noted above, in In re Bogese the court affirmed the 
Board’s finding of a forfeiture of the patentee’s patent rights based solely on the 
unreasonable delay in prosecution.118  Neither the Board nor the Federal Circuit based its 
holding on or even discussed the concept of intervening rights, which strongly suggests 
that it is not a necessary element to the defense.119  Further, a finding of prosecution 
laches while claims are still pending before the PTO would preclude the possibility of 
even determining the existence of adverse intervening rights.  That is, if the PTO never 
allowed the claims, there is no “invention” to compare to any publicly existing products, 
and a determination of what is and what is not “intervening” cannot be made. 
Additionally, the concept of “adverse intervening rights,” in contemporary times, 
is associated with reissue patents, which are distinctly separate from continuation and 
divisional patents.120  The patent laws provide that a patentee may obtain a reissue patent 
based on a prior issued patent, and which has broader claims than the previously issued 
patent.121  However, two significant limitations are associated with reissue patents.  First, 
the broader claims must be sought within two years from the issuance of the patent from 
which it is based.  Second, individuals practicing the invention covered by the reissue 
                                                 
118 See supra notes 94-100. 
119 See supra notes 101-104. 
120 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2004) (reissue of defective patents). 
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patent who begin such practice prior to the issuance of the reissue patent are granted 
“intervening rights” to continue to do so despite the reissue patent.122 
As with traditional laches addressed in Aukerman, the asserted intervening rights 
relative to a reissue patent involve the rights between the patentee and the specific alleged 
infringer charged with infringement.  A finding of intervening rights in such a situation, 
therefore, only renders the patent unenforceable against that individual alleged infringer.  
However, a finding of prosecution laches renders the patent unenforceable against anyone 
that practices the claimed invention and is therefore broader in scope and, once again, 
arguably directed to the impact of the patentee’s actions on the public. 
 The notable absence of references to either prejudice to an alleged infringer or 
intervening rights when the Federal Circuit stated their holding regarding prosecution 
laches suggest these are not elements of the defense.  Further, because prejudice and 
intervening rights typically address the actions between a patent owner and an alleged 
infringer as opposed to actions with a third party, the public, their applicability as an 
element to the defense is further questioned.  However, as will be seen, the concepts of 
prejudice and intervening rights are better considered as factors in determining the 
reasonableness of a delay. 
 
B. Burden of Proof is Preponderance of the Evidence Standard 
 
 Another issue that was left unresolved by the Symbol Technologies and the In re 
Bogese cases is the level of proof required to establish the prosecution laches defense.  
This lack of direction has resulted in varied results at the district courts, with at least one 
holding that it must be established by clear and convincing evidence,123 while others 
requiring it only be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. 124  While there are 
                                                 
122 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2004) (“A reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right of any person…who, 
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arguments for both standards, the more appropriate burden is that the defense be shown 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 The clearest sources for establishing the appropriate standard comes from the 
Federal Circuit’s addressing of the traditional laches defense and the patent laws.  In 
Aukerman, the Federal Circuit noted that the laches associated with the delay by one 
party in bringing an infringement suit and the resultant harm to another party did not 
implicate the types of concerns that generally warrant the clear and convincing 
standard.125  Therefore, the court held that the preponderance of evidence standard was 
required to establish the traditional laches defense at issue. 126 
 The court did recognize that the patent laws mandate that an issued patent be 
presumed valid and, as such, the defense of patent invalidity is required to be proven by 
clear and convincing evidence.127  This presumption of validity and increased evidentiary 
burden are based on the rigorous examination conducted by the PTO prior to issuance of 
a patent.  As patent applications are examined to determine patentability as opposed to 
simply being registered, there is a presumption that the administrative actions of the PTO 
to this end have been done correctly.128 
 While a finding of traditional laches renders the patent unenforceable only against 
the alleged individual infringer charged in the suit, and only as to pre-suit damages, a 
finding of invalidity renders the patent unenforceable as to all individuals.129  Similarly, a 
finding of prosecution laches renders the patent unenforceable against all others as 
well.130  Although a finding of prosecution laches removes all rights of exclusion it does 
                                                                                                                                                 
Corp., 281 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1151 (N.D. Ca. 2003) (“A defendant must prove this element by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”); Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Computer Motion, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-203-
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not do so by challenging the substantive validity or merits of the invention or how it was 
described, as in an invalidity challenge.  Rather, prosecution laches is directed at the 
dilatory conduct on the part of the patentee in obtaining the patent.  As such, an assertion 
of prosecution laches does not contest the presumption that the PTO has properly 
performed its duties in issuing the patent and, therefore, should only need to be shown by 
a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
 It must be noted, however, that the In re Bogese holding “that the PTO has 
authority to order forfeiture of rights for unreasonable delay” may alter this argument.131  
If the PTO begins to include an evaluation of the prosecution pendency and the patentee’s 
conduct during such pendency as part of its patent examination process, it would be 
arguable that such an evaluation was part of the substantive administrative process of the 
PTO.  As such, a prosecution laches defense would challenge the actions of the PTO and 
may therefore need to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 
 
C. No Presumption of Prosecution Laches Should Apply 
 
 Along with the elements of delay and prejudice to the alleged infringer, the 
traditional laches defense that bars recovery of pre-suit damages employs a presumption 
of laches where a patentee delays bringing suit for more than six years from when the 
patentee knew or should have known of the alleged infringement.132  Analogous to 
Federal Rule of Evidence 301, this presumption shifts the burden of going forward with 
additional evidence, but not the ultimate burden of persuasion.133  Similar to this 
presumption, and citing the Supreme Court cases of Crown Cork and General Talking 
Pictures, one district court has held that a presumption of prosecution laches could arise 
based on a patentee’s delay.134  In Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, 
the district court held that a finding of adverse intervening public rights are a prerequisite 
to establishing prosecution laches and further held: 
 
                                                 
131 See supra note 104. 
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[I]n the absence of intervening adverse rights for more than two years 
prior to the presentation of patent claims in a continuation or divisional 
application, the claims were filed “in time” rendering prosecution laches 
inapplicable . . . However, where the claims at issue were presented more 
than two years after the existence of an intervening right, the patentee 
must demonstrate sufficient excuse for the delay.135 
 
However, such a presumption is inapplicable to prosecution laches for a number of 
reasons. 
 Initially, as noted above and discussed in more detail below, while adverse 
intervening rights are a strong indicator of the reasonableness of any delay in prosecuting 
the claims of a patent, they are not an element of the revived prosecution laches defense. 
Secondly, Symbol Technologies held that a delay in the issuance of the claims 
could give rise to a finding of prosecution laches, not a delay in presenting the claims to 
the PTO.136  Significantly, claims could be presented within two years of such 
intervening rights but prevented from issuing while further outside developments in the 
field continue.  Under such a presumption, by filing additional continuation applications 
and abandoning the application in which the claims were originally presented prior to 
their issuance or final rejection, the patentee would be able to delay issuance of their 
patent until the field was dependent upon the technology and avoid the prosecution laches 
defense. 
Thirdly, and related to the argument above, the delay of prosecution laches is 
measured from the filing of the original application disclosing the subject matter to which 
priority is claimed, and not with respect to the date intervening rights arise.  This court’s 
presumption measured from the time of intervening rights shifts the Federal Circuit’s 
prosecution laches focus on the patentee’s delay in prosecuting the claims from the 
original disclosure to a focus on how quickly the patentee reacted to intervening rights.  
An original application could be filed and years of delays and continuation applications 
could follow while the patentee waited until a more developed variant of the invention 
was placed in the market.  Under this rule, as long as the patentee presented the claims to 
                                                 
135 Id. at *63. 
136 See supra note 5. 
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the PTO within two years of when those intervening rights arose, the alleged infringer 
could not argue prosecution laches. 
Further evidence that the prosecution laches delay is measured from the filing of 
the original application disclosing the subject matter is found in the Symbol Technologies 
decision.  The Federal Circuit citation to Webster points out that the delay held to be 
unreasonable was from the time the original application was filed until the issuance of a 
divisional claim to which the claims at issue had been added by amendment.137 
 Finally, and more broadly with respect to presumptions of prosecution laches, the 
Federal Circuit’s Aukerman decision provides guidance on this issue.  In discussing the 
defenses of traditional laches and equitable estoppel, the court noted that a significant 
difference was that unlike laches, no presumption of estoppel exists.138    One of the 
reasons proffered by the court for the lack of a presumption of estoppel was that the relief 
granted by a finding of estoppel is broader than that for laches.139  As noted above, a 
finding of estoppel bars the entire claim against an alleged infringer, whereas a finding of 
traditional laches only bars presuit damages.  The court reasoned that, since the whole 
suit might be barred, “the defendant should carry a burden to establish the defense based 
on proof, not a presumption.”140  Similarly, therefore, no presumption of prosecution 
laches should exist as such a finding grants broad relief by rendering the claims at issue 
unenforceable.  Rather, the alleged infringer should be required to prove the defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
 
D. Defense Should Apply to post-GATT Patents and Terminal Disclaimer Patents 
 
 Another issue faced by the district courts hearing post-Symbol Technologies 
prosecution laches arguments is the applicability of the defense to patents having a 
reduced enforceable life as a result of being post-GATT patents or having terminal 
                                                 
137 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 
1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The Court applied the doctrine in Webster…and held that an unreasonable 
eight-year delay rendered the claims at issue unenforceable.  In that case, [the patentee] filed a patent 
application in 1910…[and the claims in suit] issued in 1918…”). 
138 A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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disclaimers.141  The Symbol Technologies court was dealing with pre-GATT patents 
(patents that had been filed prior to June 8, 1995) without terminal disclaimers and did 
not address the applicability of the doctrine to such patents, thereby leaving the issue 
open.  As such, patent owners at the district courts argue that post-GATT patents and 
patents with terminal disclaimers are beyond the reach of a prosecution laches defense 
because their terms have already been tied to the original disclosure.  However, the 
inequity addressed by the prosecution laches doctrine is not only the improper time 
extension of the monopoly right, but also the prevention of a patentee lying in wait until 
the market develops around his or her invention and then bringing forth the claims to 
ensnare the unsuspecting industry.142  While the presence of terminal disclaimers and the 
limitations imposed by the GATT treaty are relevant considerations to the reasonableness 
of any delay, these items alone should not render prosecution laches inapplicable.143 
 Had the GATT patent term limitation applied in Symbol Technologies, it would 
likely have been determinative in the suit.  However, neither the 20-year patent term nor 
the tying of the term of a later patent to an earlier issued patent completely resolve the 
potential impact of patents that undergo prolonged prosecution.  Many industries 
experience periods of rapid advancement within which they come to significantly rely on 
                                                 
141 The General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was intended to harmonize U.S. patent laws 
with other countries by altering the term of a patent.  (Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 103 Pub. L. No. 
465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)).  Prior to June 8, 1995, the term of a patent was seventeen years from the date 
of issuance, such that the enforceable life of a patent did not start until after all prosecution was completed 
in the PTO.  35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).  Patent applications filed post June 8, 1995, however, have a variable 
length term that begins on the date the patent is issued and extends until twenty years from the date the 
application was filed.  35 U.S.C. §154(a)(2) (2004).  Therefore, the longer the prosecution duration, the 
shorter the enforceable life of a post-GATT patent.   
Terminal disclaimers are based on 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2004), which provides “…any patentee or applicant 
may disclaim or dedicate to the public the entire term, or any terminal part of the term, of the patent granted 
or to be granted.”  A terminal disclaimer enables the patentee to overcome an obviousness-type double 
patenting rejection by tying the term of a later issued patent to the expiration of a prior issued and 
commonly owned patent. 
142 See supra note 105. 
143 See Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 02-C-7008, 2003 WL 22125212, at *17 (N.D. Ill. 
Sept. 5, 2003) (“Review of the relevant case law leads to the conclusion that post-GATT patents and 
continuation patents may still be subject to prosecution laches.”); Digital Control Inc. v. McLaughlin 
Manufacturing Co., Inc. 248 F.Supp.2d 1015, 1018 (W.D. Wa. 2003) (“Plaintiff urges the Court to rule that 
laches could never apply to a patent under the GATT system.  However, the Court in its prior order 
declined making such a broad ruling given that no such holding was explicitly made in the Symbol case.”); 
Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1143 (E.D. Ca. 2002) (citation omitted) (“Moreover, 
a bright line rule that the prosecution laches defense never applies when a terminal disclaimer has been 
filed would run contrary to the principle that ‘with its origin in equity, a determination of laches is not 
made upon the application of mechanical rules.’”). 
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specific equipment or technology in a short period of time.  In these situations, even the 
existence of only a few years remaining on the patent term could potentially be enough 
time to create a significant impact to the developed industry.144  Therefore, to prevent 
such entrapment type tactics on fast changing industries, the defense of prosecution 
laches should apply to both post-GATT patents and patents having terminal disclaimers. 
 
IV. Factors to Consider Regarding Reasonableness and Explanation of Delay 
 
At issue in Symbol Technologies were a multitude of patents that claimed priority 
to two patent applications filed in 1954 and 1956.145  In reviewing the evidence on 
remand, the Nevada District Court pointed out that over an 87 year span more than five 
million patents were issued by the PTO, and that Lemelson held the top 13 positions for 
the longest duration of patent prosecution during that period.146  The District Court of 
Nevada held that the patentee’s “delay of from 18 to 39 years in filing the applications 
that issued as the patents-in-suit requires that Lemelson’s right to those claims be deemed 
forfeited under the equitable doctrine of prosecution laches.”147  In so holding, the court 
noted, “[i]f the defense of prosecution laches does not apply under the totality of 
circumstances presented here, the Court can envision very few circumstances under 
which it would.”148 
 Based on Lemelson’s records of 18 to 39 years in delaying patent prosecution, it 
would appear as if he has set one of the boundaries for the implication of prosecution 
                                                 
144 David L. Marcus, Is the Submarine Patent Torpedoed?:  Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson and the Revival of 
Continuation Application Laches, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 521, 526 (1997) (“[E]ven under the twenty year patent 
term many inventors will still be able to prolong the prosecution of their applications long enough for 
industries to become dependent on the technologies employing their inventions.”);  Roy H. Wepner, Patent 
Lawyers Beware:  Submarine Patents are Still Lurking, 145 N.J.L.J. 212 (1996) (“Twenty years is still a 
long time; in certain technologies, it is more than an eternity.  It is easy to envision a submarine application 
swimming underwater for 15 years, and then issuing and wreaking havoc with a fully matured industry.”); 
Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 378 (1994) 
(“The problem of submarine patents is particularly troublesome in industries characterized by rapid 
innovation, since even a modest delay in prosecuting the patent can result in catching an entire industry 
unaware.”) 
145 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, 277 F.3d 
1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
146 Id. 
147 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research Foundation, LP, --F.Supp.2d--, 
2004 WL 161331 (D. Nev. 2004). 
148 Id. 
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laches.  What is unclear is where the other boundary may lie and what factors should be 
considered in evaluating whether or not a delay is sufficiently unreasonable and 
unexplained to implicate the defense.  In the absence of further guidance from the Federal 
Circuit, this section will endeavor to address some of the issues that will demarcate that 
line.  Specifically, this section will attempt to coalesce some of the arguments made at the 
district courts and discuss various actions by a patentee during patent prosecution that 
should be considered when addressing prosecution laches. 
 
A. Prejudice and the Existence of Public Intervening Rights 
 
As noted above, the existence of prejudice and intervening rights are important 
considerations in evaluating the reasonableness of a delay in the issuance of patent 
claims.  In fact, prejudice to public intervening rights is a critical factor to consider with 
regards to reasonableness in view of the Federal Circuit’s dictum on the topic in Symbol 
Technologies.  As noted, the Federal Circuit commented that the Supreme Court cases of 
Crown Cork and General Talking Pictures ratified prosecution laches on claims that 
prejudiced intervening adverse public rights.  Specifically, the Federal Circuit observed 
that the defense of prosecution laches was not applied in Crown Cork “in the absence of 
intervening rights” and was rejected in General Talking Pictures “because there was no 
evidence of intervening public rights.”149 
Evidence that claims issuing after a delay prejudice intervening adverse public 
rights is significant for without such evidence it is arguable that the claims are not part of 
a submarine patent designed to extort a dependent industry.  Additionally, a lack of 
evidence as to the existence of adverse public rights indicates that the public has been 
provided timely notice of the inventor’s claimed property right, and that the inventor is 
not attempting to remove a valuable asset from the public domain. 
 The extent of the intervening rights should also be considered.  For example, the 
degree to which the public is prejudiced is arguably diminished if the claims at issue only 
address a tangentially related or infrequently used technology within a broader field.  
Similarly, prejudice is diminished if the invention at issue has numerous substitutes and 
                                                 
149 Symbol Technologies, 277 F.3d at 1364-65. 
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there is little or no cost associated with switching between those substitutes.  In contrast, 
claims that purport to cover the central concept of a technology, or one having few 
substitutes, will necessarily involve a greater degree of potential prejudice. 
 Furthermore, the presence of intervening public rights should be considered 
significant regardless of the size of the industry involved.  While the bar code technology 
at issue in Symbol Technologies was widely used, it can be readily understood that 
improperly delayed claims could have an equally serious impact to the users of a less 
pervasive technology. 
  
B. Post-GATT Patents and Patents with Terminal Disclaimers 
 
While it is argued above that prosecution laches should apply to post-GATT 
patents and patents having terminal disclaimers, it must also be noted that the presence of 
these patent term limiters weigh in favor of a finding that any delays in the procurement 
of the patent are reasonable.150  As the monopoly associated with these patents cannot 
extend beyond the term of the parent application, the factual scenarios in which a finding 
of prosecution laches will be found are necessarily narrowed.  Furthermore, the ability to 
bring patent infringement suits on pre-GATT patents has only a finite timeline, 
potentially limiting the applicability of the prosecution laches defense in the future.151 
 
C. Publication of Patent Application and Articles 
 
A recent change to the patent laws intended to harmonize the laws of the United 
States with other nations provides relief from the damage a submarine patent can cause.  
The provisions of the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 providing for the 
publication of pending applications provides a method whereby the public may be put on 
                                                 
150 See Digital Control Inc. v. McLaughlin Manufacturing Co., Inc. 248 F.Supp.2d 1015, 1018 (W.D. Wa. 
2003) (“[P]atents subject to GATT or terminal disclaimers limiting patent protection to twenty years will 
tend to be reasonable.”); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 268 F.Supp.2d 1139, 1143 (E.D. Ca. 2002) (“[I]t 
certainly is appropriate to weigh the filing of a terminal disclaimer as an equitable consideration, and . . . it 
may weigh strongly in favor of finding the delay is reasonable . . . .”). 
151 The GATT term limitation went into effect on June 8, 1995, therefore, the final 17-year term patents 
will expire on June 8, 2012.  Adding the six-year time limitation on infringement damages of 35 U.S.C. § 
286 means that the last complaint filed on 17-year term patents will be June 8, 2018. 
 31
notice of what the patentee claims as his or her invention.152  Prior to implementation of 
this act, pending applications were kept in strict confidence during prosecution such that 
the public was unaware of any pending claimed patent rights.  In contrast, current patent 
laws provide that “each application for a patent shall be published…promptly after the 
expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date for which” priority is 
being claimed.153  With respect to continuation applications, the 18 month period is 
measured from the filing of the parent application such that if the parent application has 
been pending in the PTO for at least 18 months prior to the filing of the continuation 
application, the continuation application will be immediately published.  Although patent 
applications must frequently be amended during the prosecution process and are therefore 
rarely issued exactly as filed, the public is at least put on notice of the general subject 
matter of the application when published in this manner. 
 Patent application publication as a method of providing public notice and 
preventing a patent from unknowingly “surfacing” is, however, subject to a significant 
caveat.  The patent laws provide that a patent application shall not be published if the 
patentee so requests.154  As such, the public may be prevented from obtaining notice of 
both the parent application and any associated continuation applications if the patentee 
elects to keep the applications in confidence. 
 Similar to the public notice provided by the publication of an application, a 
patentee’s publication in a scientific or trade journal of the claimed invention is also 
evidence that the patentee is attempting to provide notice to the public.155  Such actions 
indicate that the patentee is intending to market and exploit the claimed invention as 
opposed to entrap those who have substantively advanced use of the invention 
independently of the patentee. 
 
                                                 
152 Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. 106-113 [§4502(a)], 113 Stat. 1501A-561. 
153 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2004). 
154 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) (2004) (“If an applicant makes a request upon filing, certifying that the 
invention disclosed in the application has not and will not be the subject of an application filed in another 
country, or under a multilateral international agreement, that requires publication of applications 18 months 
after filing, the application shall not be published as provided in paragraph (1).”) 
155 See Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 281 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1153 (N.D. Ca. 2003) (“[P]laintiff’s publication of 
his invention in a computer science periodical reflects plaintiff’s willingness to publicize his invention(s) to 
those in the field of the invention(s) prior to the issuance of any patent for the invention(s).”). 
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D. Issuance of Patents in a Chain of Patents 
 
Like the public notice provided by patent application publication, if the claims at 
issue in an infringement suit evolve from a series of continuation applications in which 
some or all of the previously filed applications have issued as patents, it is arguable that 
any delays in the issuance of the allegedly infringed claims are not unreasonable.  The 
issuance of patents upon a finding of allowable claims by a patent examiner and the 
pursuing of the rejected claims and/or additional claims in a continuation application 
indicates that the patentee is attempting to provide notice to the public as well as obtain 
all the protection that he or she believes they are entitled to.  In contrast, the repeated 
abandonment of previously filed applications in favor of new continuation applications, 
especially when an examiner has indicated the existence of allowable claims, may be 
evidence that weighs against a finding of reasonableness of any delays. 
It must be noted, however, that the mere presence of a chain of continuation 
applications in the prosecution history of an allegedly infringed patent claim cannot, 
without more, establish an unreasonable delay.  The practice of filing continuation 
applications has long been known and may even be increasing in popularity due to 
practitioners’ perceived uncertainty in claim interpretation by the Federal Circuit and 
recent decisions affecting the interpretation of claims under the doctrine of equivalents.156  
Therefore, practitioners believe it is more important than ever to obtain patent claims that 
read literally on an allegedly infringing product.  In order to obtain such claims, 
practitioners frequently maintain at least one pending continuation application before the 
PTO in order to insert or amend claims to read directly on a product that the patentee 
believes is misappropriating the invention. 
 
E. Actions by Patentee/PTO to Speed or Delay Prosecution 
 
 An additional issue to consider in assessing the reasonableness of any delays in 
the issuance of claims is whether or not any actions were taken by the patentee or the 
                                                 
156 Steven B. Pokotilow, Charles E. Cantine, File Early and File Often, 4 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 9 
(January 2004) (recommending the maintaining of a pending application such that the claims of the 
continuation application may be amended to capture a competitor’s product). 
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PTO that either expedited or delayed prosecution of the claims.157  For example, while 
the PTO normally examines patent applications in the order in which they are received, a 
patentee may be able to advance examination of an application by filing a “petition to 
make special” if any one of certain criteria are established.158  These criteria include the 
existence of a device that would infringe the invention of the application, the patentee is 
in poor health, the patentee is at least 65 years of age, the invention of the application 
would materially enhance the environment, or the invention relates to the development of 
energy resources.159  The existence of a petition to make special weighs in favor of a 
finding of reasonableness with respect to the issuance of allegedly infringed claims.  
Conversely, electing not to file a petition to make special when any of these criteria are 
present may be evidence of an unreasonable delay. 
 Another consideration in assessing the reasonableness of the issuance of claims is 
whether or not there were any delays on the part of the PTO.  Because the PTO receives 
enormous quantities of mail it is not unheard of for an application or a response to a 
patent Examiner’s objection to be lost or misplaced by the PTO.160  Any delays in the 
issuance of claims that are attributable to the PTO should certainly not be held against a 
patentee.161 
 
F. Interferences and Prosecution of Other Patents 
 
 The traditional laches defense that denies a patent owner pre-suit damages as a 
result of a delay in bringing suit against an alleged infringer recognizes “other litigation” 
as an excuse for that delay. 162  That is, a patent owner may still be allowed to pursue an 
action against an alleged infringer despite a delay in bringing suit if the patent owner had 
                                                 
157 See Reiffin 281 F.Supp.2d at 1149 (discussing the reasonableness of a delay as depending upon whether 
or not it can be explained by “legitimate considerations” that include the patentee or PTO taking unusual 
steps to speed or delay the application process). 
158 37 C.F.R. § 1.102 (2003);  See also Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 708.02. 
159 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 708.02. 
160 Ideas That Become Valuable Innovations; A Patent and Trademark Office Review, Fiscal Year 1998, 
USPTO, at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/1998/a98r-2.htm  (“The PTO received 240,090 
utility, plant, and reissue applications in FY 1998.”) 
161 See Reiffin 281 F.Supp.2d at 1152. 
162 See A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Construction Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“A 
court must also consider and weigh any justification offered by the plaintiff of its delay.  Excuses which 
have been recognized in some instances . . . include: other litigation . . . ”). 
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been engaged in some other litigation regarding the patent during the delay.  Similarly, 
the prosecution of other patent applications that are related to the allegedly infringed 
claims may provide an excuse for any delays in issuance.163  A patentee with multiple 
pending applications may choose to prioritize the prosecution of some applications in 
advance of others in order to, for example, craft the various applications towards 
particular embodiments of the invention. 
 Also analogous to the other litigation excuse of the traditional laches defense 
would be the existence of interferences during the prosecution of a patent application.  
An interference is a proceeding before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
within the PTO to determine who is the first to invent the subject matter of a patent 
application that conflicts with another pending application or an unexpired patent.164  The 
existence of an interference in the prosecution of claims will delay the issuance of those 
claims and as an interference is a determination of ownership of rights and not a device 
used by the patentee to delay public notification of those rights, such delays caused by an 
interference should not be held against the patentee. 
 
G. Existence of Requirement by PTO to “Substantively Advance Prosecution” 
 
As discussed above, in In re Bogese the Federal Circuit held that a patent 
Examiner can require a patentee to make a “substantive amendment to advance 
prosecution” or risk forfeiture of any patent rights.165  In light of this holding, a showing 
that the PTO issued a patentee such an ultimatum would be strong evidence regarding the 
                                                 
163 See Stambler v. RSA Security, Inc., 243 F.Supp.2d 74, 76 n.3 (“Defendants argue that plaintiff’s delay 
of more than three years in filing the division applications . . . constitutes an unreasonable delay.  This court 
disagrees.  During this period, plaintiff was prosecuting two other applications based on the original 
application . . . . Plaintiff’s delay . . . under these circumstances is not unreasonable.”); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. 
Vysis, Inc., No. 99-CV-2688 H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25020, at *120-21 (S.D. Ca. Aug. 2, 2002) 
(refusing to “second-guess” the business decisions of patent attorney as to filing of continuation 
applications due to heavy work load). 
164 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (2004) (“Whenever an application is made for a patent which . . . would interfere 
with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, an interference may be declared . . . The Board 
of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall determine questions of the inventions and may determine 
questions of patentability.”). 
165 See supra notes 92-104. 
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unreasonableness of a delay.166  If a patentee did not diligently prosecute until an 
Examiner required such a substantive amendment, this would indicate that the patentee 
was not prosecuting in good faith and, therefore, that an unreasonable delay occurred. 
 
H. Length of the Delay 
 
The number of years involved in the prosecution of claims must certainly be 
considered when evaluating the reasonableness of a delay.  However, as the awarding of 
a patent is dependent upon many factors, such as the scope of the claims being pursued 
and the number of pre-existing patents in the technological field at issue, the duration of 
patent prosecution various greatly.  As previously noted, Lemelson’s delays of 18 to 39 
years between the filing of the original parent applications and the filing of the allegedly 
infringed patents were found on remand to be unreasonable.  Since Symbol Technologies, 
district courts have held that delays of 15, 11, 9, and 7 years between the filing of the 
original parent application and the issuance of the allegedly infringed patent were not 
unreasonable when considered together with the other facts of the cases.167  Therefore, 
the duration of patent prosecution is necessarily only one factor of many that must be 
considered. 
 
I. Kingsdown 
 
 District courts hearing prosecution laches arguments have also been faced with an 
apparent tension created by the Symbol Technologies decision relative to the 1988 
                                                 
166 See Cummins-Allison Corp. v. Glory, Ltd., No. Civ.A. 02-C-7008, 2003 WL 355470 at *41 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 12, 2003) (noting that the examiner did not refuse to issue the patent-in-suit on the ground of dilatory 
conduct by the patentee despite the examiner having such authority).   
167 Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 281 F.Supp.2d 1149 (N.D. Ca. 2003) (plaintiff was not barred by prosecution 
laches from pursuing patent infringement claim despite nearly 15 year prosecution period from application 
to issuance); Gen-Probe, Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., No. 99-CV-2688 H, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25020 at *121 
(S.D. Ca. Aug. 2, 2002) (“In light of [the] evidence, the Court finds that the eleven years between filing and 
issuance of the [allegedly infringed] patent is not unreasonable.”); Intuitive Surgical, Inc. v. Computer 
Motion, Inc., No. Civ.A. 01-203-SLR, 2002 WL 31833867 (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2002) (based on facts of case, 
nine year period between original filing and issuance of patent-in-suit was not constitute an unreasonable 
and unexplained delay such that prosecution laches did not apply); Stambler, 243 F.Supp.2d 74 (as a matter 
of law, patent-in-suit did not issue after an unreasonable delay despite seven year period between original 
filing and issuance). 
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Federal Circuit case of Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc.168 The 
Kingsdown decision addressed another equitable defense, inequitable conduct, which is 
an offense against the PTO and the public that occurs during patent prosecution when an 
applicant fails to prosecute the application with candor, good faith, and honesty.169  As 
stated in Kingsdown, “inequitable conduct resides in failure to disclose material 
information, or submission of false material information, with an intent to deceive.”170 
In Kingsdown the situation of a patentee amending a pending application on an 
ostomy appliance to cover a competitor’s product was addressed.  While the original 
application was pending, the plaintiff’s patent attorney observed an ostomy device 
manufactured by the defendant.  Thereafter, a continuation application was filed with 
claims to cover the defendant’s device.171  A patent issued on this continuation 
application six-and-a-half years after the original application was filed and the plaintiff 
sued the defendant for infringement.172 
 The district court found that the plaintiff’s actions of observing the defendant’s 
product and prosecuting a patent to “cover” that device evidenced deceitful intent, which 
contributed to a finding of inequitable conduct.  In reversing this conclusion, the Federal 
Circuit held:  
 
[T]here is nothing improper, illegal or inequitable in filing a patent 
application for the purpose of obtaining a right to exclude a known 
competitor’s product from the market; nor is it in any manner improper to 
amend or insert claims intended to cover a competitor’s product the 
applicant[]…has learned about during the prosecution of a patent 
application.  Any such amendment or insertion must comply with all 
statutes and regulations, of course, but, if it does, its genesis in the 
marketplace is simply irrelevant and cannot of itself evidence deceitful 
intent.173 
 
This statement by the Federal Circuit cited their previous decision in State Industries, Inc. 
v. A.O. Smith Corp., which dealt with an allegation of willful infringement of a patent.  
                                                 
168 Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
169 ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT §12.4, at 642 (6th Edition 2003). 
170 Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 872 (citing J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. v. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 
(Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985)). 
171 Kingsdown, at 870. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 874 (citing State Indus., Inc., v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
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There, the Federal Circuit characterized the actions of the parties as “classic commercial 
gamesmanship under the patent system,” as opposed to willful infringement, because the 
parties were competitors and the alleged infringer was simply 
 
trying to match a new product of the other with a new product of its own, 
not copied but doing the same job, and the other manipulating its secret 
pending patent application to cover the functionally competitive structure 
it did not think of but deems to embody its proprietary ‘inventive 
concept.’174   
 
 What is not clear between the Kingsdown and Symbol Technologies decisions is 
when is a delay between the filing of an original application and the filing of a 
continuation application, or the amending of a pending continuation application, 
acceptable under Kingsdown and improper under Symbol Technologies.175 
 In A&E Products v. Mainetti USA Inc., the District Court for the Southern District 
of New York denied cross motions for summary judgment on the defense of prosecution 
laches and in so doing dealt with the conflict between Symbol Technologies and 
Kingsdown more than any other district court.176  The patentee claimed that it reviewed 
its competitor’s products to determine if the patentee’s devices were being copied and 
then, per Kingsdown, filed a continuation application to cover those competing 
products.177  The court ordered the patentee to submit an affidavit identifying both the 
competitive products he targeted and when he learned of those products.178  In response 
to this affidavit, the court held that the patentee raised a genuine issue of material fact 
                                                 
174 State Indus., 751 F.2d at 1235. 
175 One district court summarized the tension as follows: 
Kingsdown did not address the question of how a long period of delay affects the equities 
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regarding whether any delays were unreasonable and unexplained and, therefore, denied 
the alleged infringer’s motion for summary judgment.179 
 However, although the patentee claimed that the continuation applications were 
filed to target known competitive products, the court observed that the deposition 
testimony of the patentee’s patent attorney suggested otherwise.180  The patent attorney’s 
testimony indicated that he had invented the devices of the chain of applications based on 
“‘reasonable variations…just broad enough in scope to be useful.’”181  The court noted 
that this testimony 
 
suggest[s], in light of a record which shows each continuation or 
divisional application was filed by [the patentee] on the very last day 
before issuance of its predecessor patent…that the applications for 
the…[patents-in-suit] could have been prepared before or soon after the 
issuance of the [original patent], and may have been deliberately held in 
abeyance and filed seriatim to affect competition adversely.182 
 
 The court’s focus in A&E Products on whether or not the patentee actually knew 
of a specific product made by the competitor prior to filing an application suggests a 
literal reading of the Kingsdown holding regarding “a known competitor’s product.”  
That is, the court appears to suggest that claims in a continuation application are only 
proper when they cover a known product.  Furthermore, the court’s reasoning suggests 
that it views as improper the filing of a series of applications that “could have been 
prepared before or soon after the issuance of the [original patent].”183  While a detailed 
analysis of Kingsdown relative to Symbol Technologies is outside the scope of this paper, 
two points must be made regarding the A&E Products decision. 
One, a literal reading of Kingsdown is arguably improper.  In Kingsdown, the 
Federal Circuit had reversed a district court finding that the observation of a competitor’s 
product and the writing of claims to cover that product indicated an intent to deceive the 
PTO.  Certainly it is even less “deceitful” to draft claims that are not directed at a 
particular competitor’s device, but rather are believed to be within the scope of the 
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patentee’s invention.  As such, the suggestion by the court in A&E Products that a 
patentee must “know” of a competitor’s product in order for the claims of a continuation 
application to be acceptable seems misplaced. 
Two, the suggestion by the court that the filing of a series of applications 
indicates an intent to adversely affect competition when those applications could have 
been filed closer in proximity to the filing of the original application has significant 
implications.  As previously noted, it is a common patent prosecution practice to maintain 
pending continuation applications as a means of preserving the right to insert claims 
directed at devices that are viewed as misappropriating the invention.184  Furthermore, 
this practice is employed not to entrap an industry, but rather as a means to protect the 
full scope of an invention without having to rely on uncertain claim interpretation.  
Viewing the mere presence of a chain of continuation applications as an indicator of 
prosecution laches, as the A&E court appears to do, would adversely impact a common 
patent prosecution practice. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
 Although the Symbol Technologies decision has made it clear that the equitable 
doctrine of prosecution laches may bar enforcement of claims, the application and scope 
of the doctrine is unclear and it is difficult to predict what affect the decision will have on 
patent infringement suits and the patent prosecution process.  District courts hearing 
prosecution laches arguments post-Symbol Technologies have struggled with the revived 
doctrine in light of the unusual facts of the case and the limited guidance provided by its 
holding.185  Furthermore, the lack of clarity surrounding the doctrine should cause patent 
prosecutors to proceed with caution, as it is uncertain what current actions could render 
the patent claims they obtain unenforceable in the future.   
Further development by the Federal Circuit on the recently recognized 
prosecution laches defense would benefit both the public that relies on the patent system 
and the legal community involved in patent prosecution and litigation.  However, until 
                                                 
184 See supra note 156. 
185 See supra note 9. 
 40
the Federal Circuit speaks further on prosecution laches, courts will be forced to make 
decisions based on their views of the doctrine.  Inevitably, as has already occurred, these 
courts will come to different conclusions as to the elements, burden, and factors 
surrounding the defense.186  Therefore, until the Federal Circuit expounds further, legal 
discourse should occur in order to provide guidance to the district courts regarding these 
issues.   
As presented in this paper, the delay of prosecution laches affects the public and 
the defense does not attack the substantive examination of the claims by the PTO, 
therefore, the defense should be found when a preponderance of the evidence indicates 
that an unreasonable and unexplained delay occurred during patent prosecution.  
Furthermore, prosecution laches should be established by proof and not a presumption 
and can apply to post-GATT patents and patents with terminal disclaimers.  As 
prosecution laches is an equitable defense that is not established by “mechanical rules,” 
courts must consider “all of the particular facts and circumstances of each case and weigh 
the equities of the parties.”187  Some of the more important factors to consider include 
prejudice to adverse intervening public rights, voluntary publication of applications, 
issuance of patents from a chain of continuation applications, and any actions intending 
to delay or expedite prosecution. 
Finally, the Federal Circuit must clarify when is a delay between the filing of an original 
application and the filing of a continuation application, or the amending of a pending 
continuation application, acceptable under Kingsdown and improper under Symbol 
Technologies. 
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